| Citation: |
WEI Qi, GUO Yan. Tripartite Game Simulation of Voluntary Carbon Emission Reduction by Enterprises Under Bidirectional Mechanism[J]. Journal of South China Normal University (Natural Science Edition), 2024, 56(2): 42-54. DOI: 10.6054/j.jscnun.2024021
|
Carbon emission reduction in industrial enterprises is particularly important for balancing environmental protection and economic development. The factors influencing the voluntary carbon emission reduction of enterprises were explered based on the bidirectional mechanism of government and consumers. The evolutionary stability of each participant's strategy choice is analyzed by constructing a Tripartite Evolutionary Game model of government, enterprises and consumers based on the government's positive incentive mechanism and the consumer's anti-driving mechanism. The stability of the equilibrium point in the Tripartite Game System is further analyzed by exploring the influence mechanism of each parameter on the voluntary carbon emission reduction of enterprises from the perspective of system dynamics when different strategies are chosen by the three subjects. The results show that the probability of choosing voluntary emission reduction strategy is positively correlated with the parameters of the amount of benefits brought to enterprises by consumers' low-carbon consumption and government non-material incentives, the subsidy rate of emission reduction costs, government bonuses, and the amount of loss of enterprises' carbon disclosure; and negatively correlated with the parameters of enterprises' low-carbon marketing costs, the value of green points, and consumption pollution. Finally, MATLAB 2016a numerical simulation is used to verify the above conclusions and put forward relevant suggestions in the context of practice.
| [1] |
刘朝, 王梓林, 原慈佳. 结构视域下自主技术创新对工业碳排放的影响及趋势预测[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2022, 32(7): 12-21. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGRZ202207002.htm
LIU Z, WANG Z L, YUAN C J. Impact of independent technological innovation on industrial carbon emissions and trend prediction from the perspective of structure[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2022, 32(7): 12-21. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGRZ202207002.htm
|
| [2] |
张志勋. 论我国碳排放权交易体系的构建[J]. 企业经济, 2012, 31(6): 178-181. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-QUIT201206043.htm
|
| [3] |
陆敏, 苍玉权, 李岩岩. 强制减排交易机制外企业会自愿减排么?[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2019, 29(5): 21-29. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGRZ201905003.htm
LU M, CANG Y Q, LI Y Y. Do enterprises choose voluntary emissions trading outside mandatory mechanism?[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2019, 29(5): 21-29. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGRZ201905003.htm
|
| [4] |
梅德文, 葛兴安, 邵诗洋. 自愿减排交易助力实现"双碳"目标[J]. 清华金融评论, 2021(10): 56-59. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JRQH202110019.htm
|
| [5] |
王道平, 尹一博, 董汉玺. 考虑政府补贴和制造商互惠偏好的碳减排策略研究[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2023, 43(8): 2064-2085. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-STYS202308009.htm
WANG D P, YIN Y B, DONG H X. Research on carbon emission reduction strategies considering government subsidies and manufacturers' reciprocal preferences[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 2023, 43(8): 2064-2085. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-STYS202308009.htm
|
| [6] |
魏琦, 丁亚楠. 计及消费领域的碳补贴政策演化博弈[J]. 中国环境科学, 2022, 42(3): 1456-1465. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGHJ202203052.htm
WEI Q, DING Y N. An evolutionary game of carbon subsidy policy considering consumption field[J]. China Environmental Science, 2022, 42(3): 1456-1465. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGHJ202203052.htm
|
| [7] |
巨烨. 浅析央行碳减排支持工具及其对市场的影响[J]. 中国财政, 2022(5): 80-81. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGCE202205040.htm
|
| [8] |
王志强, 周隽, 沈月琴. 基于自愿协议减排的企业演化博弈分析[J]. 浙江农林大学学报, 2014, 31(5): 785-790. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZJLX201405022.htm
WANG Z Q, ZHOU J, SHEN Y Q. Evolutionary game analysis of enterprises' emission reduction based on voluntary agreement[J]. Journal of Zhejiang A&F University, 2014, 31(5): 785-790. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZJLX201405022.htm
|
| [9] |
周鹏, 高朱红, 闻雯. 政府补贴、碳减排目标约束与工业企业低碳策略选择[J]. 北京理工大学学报(社会科学版), 2022, 24(4): 118-128. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-BLDS202204011.htm
ZHOU P, GAO Z H, WEN W. Government Subsidies, Constraints on emission reduction targets and firm's Low-Carbon strategy selections in industrial sector[J]. Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition), 2022, 24(4): 118-128. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-BLDS202204011.htm
|
| [10] |
陈晓红, 王钰, 李喜华. 环境规制下区域间企业绿色技术转型策略演化稳定性研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2021, 41(7): 1732-1749. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-XTLL202107009.htm
CHEN X H, WANG Y, LI X H. Research on green technology transformation strategy of inter-regional enterprises under environmental regulation based on evolutionary game theory[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2021, 41(7): 1732-1749. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-XTLL202107009.htm
|
| [11] |
吴健宇, 袁涛, 李洁, 等. 碳中和视角下广东省主体功能区特征与优化策略研究[J]. 华南师范大学学报(自然科学版), 2022, 54(3): 111-127. doi: 10.6054/j.jscnun.2022050
WU J Y, YUAN T, LI J, et al. On the characteristics and optimization strategies of Guangdong province's major functional zones from the perspective of carbon neutrality[J]. Journal of South China Normal University(Natural Science Edition), 2022, 54(3): 111-127. doi: 10.6054/j.jscnun.2022050
|
| [12] |
程承, 安润飞, 董康银, 等. 碳交易机制引导下可再生能源发电企业创新策略研究——基于演化博弈视角[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024(3): 82-94. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGGK202403009.htm
CHENG C, AN R F, DONG K Y, et al. Research on innovation strategy for renewable power generation enterprises under the background of carbon trading mechanism-from the perspective of evolutionary game[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024(3): 82-94. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGGK202403009.htm
|
| [13] |
武丹, 杨玉香. 考虑消费者低碳偏好的供应链减排微分博弈模型研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(4): 126-137. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGGK202104013.htm
WU D, YANG Y X. Study on the differential dame model for supply Chain with consumers' low carbon preference[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(4): 126-137. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGGK202104013.htm
|
| [14] |
VANCLAY J K, SHORTISS J, AULSEBROOK S, et al. Customer response to carbon labeling of groceries[J]. Journal of Consumer Policy, 2011, 34(1): 153-160. doi: 10.1007/s10603-010-9140-7
|
| [15] |
陈佳浩. "双碳"目标下政府、制造业企业与消费者的三方博弈[J]. 中国商论, 2023(12): 75-78. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGSM202312020.htm
CHEN J H. The trilateral game among the government, manufacturing companies, and consumers under goals of carbon neutrality and carbon peak[J]. China Journal of Commerce, 2023(12): 75-78. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGSM202312020.htm
|
| [16] |
张金泉, 温素彬, 李慧, 等. 低碳经济下供应链运营决策的演化博弈分析——基于政府-企业-消费者的协同作用视角[J/OL]. 运筹与管理, 2023: 1-9.
|
| [17] |
昝欣, 欧国立. "补贴退坡"背景下补贴模式异质性与消费者购买行为的博弈研究[J]. 中央财经大学学报, 2021(5): 94-108. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZYCY202105009.htm
ZAN X, OU G L. Game study on the heterogeneity of subsidy models and consumers' purchase behaviors under the background of "Subsidy Regression"[J]. Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics, 2021(5): 94-108. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZYCY202105009.htm
|
| [18] |
刘志华, 徐军委, 张彩虹. 省域横向碳生态补偿的演化博弈分析[J]. 软科学, 2021, 35(11): 115-122. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-XUXI202111018.htm
LIU Z H, XU J W, ZHANG C H. The evolutionary game analysis of inter-provincial horizontal carbon ecological compensation[J]. Soft Science, 2021, 35(11): 115-122. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-XUXI202111018.htm
|
| [19] |
李璟, 谢家平, 古丽扎尔·艾赛提. 非对称信息下考虑绿色偏好差异化与碳约束的减排定价策略优化[J/OL]. 中国管理科学, 2021: 1-13.
LI J, XIE J P, GULIZHAER A. Optimization of emission reducing and pricing decisions based on differentiated green preference and carbon constraints under information asymmetry[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022: 1-13.
|
| [20] |
FRIEDMAN D. Evolutionary games in economics[J]. Econometrica, 1991, 59(3): 637-666. doi: 10.2307/2938222
|
| [21] |
朱立龙, 荣俊美, 张思意. 政府奖惩机制下药品安全质量监管三方演化博弈及仿真分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(11): 55-67. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGGK202111006.htm
ZHU L L, RONG J M, ZHANG S Y. Three-party evolutionary game and simulation analysis of drug quality supervision under the government reward and punishment mechanism[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(11): 55-67. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGGK202111006.htm
|
| 1. |
李广宏，杨文静. 四川省21个市（州）旅游效率评价及其影响因素研究. 重庆科技大学学报(社会科学版). 2025(01): 25-39 .
|
Supported by: Beijing Renhe Information Technology Co., Ltd. 
DownLoad: