Tripartite Game Simulation of Voluntary Carbon Emission Reduction by Enterprises Under Bidirectional Mechanism

Carbon emission reduction in industrial enterprises is particularly important for balancing environmental protection and economic development. The factors influencing the voluntary carbon emission reduction of enterprises were explered based on the bidirectional mechanism of government and consumers. The evolutionary stability of each participant's strategy choice is analyzed by constructing a Tripartite Evolutionary Game model of government, enterprises and consumers based on the government's positive incentive mechanism and the consumer's anti-driving mechanism. The stability of the equilibrium point in the Tripartite Game System is further analyzed by exploring the influence mechanism of each parameter on the voluntary carbon emission reduction of enterprises from the perspective of system dynamics when different strategies are chosen by the three subjects. The results show that the probability of choosing voluntary emission reduction strategy is positively correlated with the parameters of the amount of benefits brought to enterprises by consumers' low-carbon consumption and government non-material incentives, the subsidy rate of emission reduction costs, government bonuses, and the amount of loss of enterprises' carbon disclosure; and negatively correlated with the parameters of enterprises' low-carbon marketing costs, the value of green points, and consumption pollution. Finally, MATLAB 2016a numerical simulation is used to verify the above conclusions and put forward relevant suggestions in the context of practice.